A Correspondence Theory of Objects? On Kant's Notions of Object, Truth, and Actuality by Vanzo, Alberto
History of Philosophy Quarterly 
Volume 25, Number 3, July 2008 
A CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF 
OBJECTS? ON KANT'S NOTIONS OF 
OBJECT, TRUTH, AND ACTUALITY 
Alberto Vanzo 
Introduction 
Can 
an idealist endorse a correspondence theory of truth, or are cor 
respondence theories inextricably bound to metaphysical realism? 
Philosophers have given differing answers to this question.1 However, 
explicit arguments for the compatibility or incompatibility of idealism 
and correspondence theories are rare finds. Many philosophers, such as 
Hilary Putnam and Nelson Goodman,2 simply assumed that only realists 
can be correspondence theorists. Several of their opponents pointed out 
that they see no reason why an idealist cannot have a correspondence 
theory of truth.3 
A similar situation can be found in the literature on Kant. Many in 
terpreters assumed that Kant, being an idealist about objects in space 
and time, cannot endorse a correspondence theory of truth for judgments 
on those objects.4 However, few authors provided arguments in support 
of this claim. 
This paper discusses one of those rare arguments. It will be named 
"Cassirer's argument," from its most famous upholder. The paper ar 
gues that Cassirer's argument fails to prove that Kant cannot have a 
correspondence theory of truth. 
The assumption that Kant was an idealist about objects in space and 
time will not be questioned here. I will only argue that Kant's concep 
tion of spatio-temporal objects is immune from Cassirer's objection. This 
paper solely considers Kant's Critical views, understood as the views 
that Kant endorsed from 1781 to his death in 1804. 
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The study of Cassirer's argument is interesting for three reasons. 
First, it sheds light on the relations between Kant's notions of object, 
truth, and actuality, which play a central role in his Critical philosophy. 
Second, it contributes to the discussion of the intricate and debated 
question, whether Kant had or rejected a correspondence theory of 
truth. Third, it provides us with some insight into the relation between 
idealism and correspondence theories of truth. 
1. Cassirer's Interpretation 
Cassirer outlines his interpretation of Kant's conception of truth in 
passages like the following: 
If it is possible to designate the determination of the relation between 
truth and actuality as the general topic of epistemology, then par 
ticular historical ages differ from each other in that they conceive of 
those two concepts, whose relation is to be established, in a different 
order and sequence. . . . [T]here is a characteristic difference as to 
whether one starts the investigation from the one or the other concept: 
whether the "being" of things counts as the certain, given element, 
and we move from it to orientate ourselves with respect to the sense 
and content of the concept of truth, or whether, vice versa, one at 
tempts to determine the ultimate significance of objective judgments 
moving from the validity of determinate criteria of truth, which are 
regarded as certain.5 
According to Cassirer, Kant rejects the first horn of the alternative. In 
order to explain what truth is, "the concept of'object' does not enable us 
to give any satisfactory answer."6 This is because, for Kant, "the explana 
tion that the truth of a cognition means its 'agreement with the object' 
proves to be circular."7 "[I]t is not because there is a world of objects 
that there is for us, as their impression and image, a world of cognitions 
and truths; rather, because there are unconditionally certain judgments 
. . . there is for us an order which is designated not only as an order of 
impressions and representations, but also as an order of objects."8 "[I]n 
the Critical sense, the truth [i.e., actuality] of the object is always to be 
grasped and substantiated only through the truth of the judgment."9 
Truth, or at least empirical truth, is to be defined as the coherence of a 
judgment with the deliverances of the senses and with the laws which 
govern their synthesis (hereafter called "the transcendental laws of 
knowledge").10 Actual objects are to be defined as those items whose 
existence is implied by true judgments. The very notion of actual object 
is to be defined by means of the notion of true judgment.11 
If this is so, then of course true judgments correspond with actual 
objects, or more precisely, with the objects they are about. However, this 
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explains at most what an actual object is, and not what truth is. If Kant 
tried to perspicuously explain what truth is by means of the notion of 
actual object, he would formulate a circular explanation, because the 
notion of actual object is to be explained by means of the notion of truth. 
It follows that Kant cannot have a correspondence theory of truth. He 
can have at most a correspondence theory of objects. 
2. Formulating Cassirer's Argument 
A precise formulation of Cassirer's argument is provided below, preceded 
by four points. 
First, following Kant's usage, truth-bearers will be called "judgments" 
or "cognitions." No attempt will be made to clarify precisely what Kan 
tian judgments and cognitions are. The focus will be on those judgments 
which can be true or false, although some judgments, such as judgments 
of perception, might not bear any truth-value for Kant. 
Second, objects, and not facts, will be regarded as the items with 
which judgments must correspond to be true. Kant constantly men 
tions the correspondence of judgments or cognitions with objects, and 
not with facts. Consider, for instance, the following passage of the first 
Critique: 
Tl If truth consists in the agreement of a cognition with its object, 
then this object must thereby be distinguished from others; for 
a cognition is false if it does not agree with the object to which it 
is related even if it contains something that could well be valid 
of other objects. (A 58/B 83, italics added)12 
Third, the fact that there are true judgments about non-existent 
objects will not be taken into account. If only actual objects are truth 
makers of Kantian judgments, it might be hard to find truth-makers 
for judgments about non-existent objects. Kant does not provide any 
suggestion as to how one might solve this problem, and this paper will 
not solve it on Kant's behalf. 
Fourth, a pessimistic attitude toward circularity will be adopted. 
Kant states that definitions cannot be circular in his logic lectures (L. 
Dohna, 24:7606_n; Wiener L., 24:92421_29; L. Bauch, RT 127, p. 261119_121). 
For Cassirer, the fact that the notion of object is defined by means of 
the notion of truth provides a good reason to reject a definition of truth 
which employs the notion of object. Kant and Cassirer do not grant that, 
under certain circumstances, circular definitions and explanations are 
acceptable. In the last thirty years, however, philosophers have produced 
good arguments for the claim that circular definitions and explanations 
are not always "vicious," but they are sometimes acceptable, or even 
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recommendable.13 This discussion of Cassirer's argument will not rely 
on their claim. It will adopt Kant's and Cassirer's restrictive view that 
no circular definition or explanation should be accepted. Then, it will 
argue that Kant's eventual endorsement of a correspondence theory of 
truth does not involve any circular definition or explanation. 
Cassirer's argument can be formulated as follows: 
(Cl) In a correspondence theory of truth, the notion of truth cannot 
appear in the definition of actual object, or in the most perspicu 
ous explanation of what an actual object is. 
(C2) Kant's definition or most perspicuous explanation of the notion 
of an actual object employs the notion of truth. 
.*. (C3) Kant cannot have a correspondence theory of truth. 
Is this argument correct? Cl is not contentious, at least as long 
as we reject every circular explanation. If truth is defined as the cor 
respondence of a judgment with an actual object, and if the notion of 
truth appears in the definition or, in absence of a definition, in the most 
perspicuous explanation of the notion of actual object, the definition of 
truth will be circular, and therefore it should be rejected. C3 follows 
from Cl and C2. Then, the question to answer is whether C2 is true, or 
in other words, whether Kant's definition or most perspicuous expla 
nation of the notion of actual object employs the notion of truth. It is 
necessary to inquire into whether the notion of truth appears in Kant's 
definition or explanation of the notion of object, or in his definition or 
explanation of the notion of actuality, for these are the two components 
of the notion of actual object. 
3. Two Notions of Object 
The English word "object" corresponds to two words in Kant's lexicon: 
"Object" (often replaced with the modern form "Objekt" by the editors 
of Kant's works) and "Gegenstand."14 Kant sometimes uses the term 
"Object" to designate phenomenal objects. For instance, he writes in 
the B-Deduction: 
T2 Understanding is, generally speaking, the faculty of cognitions. 
These consist in the determinate relation of given representa 
tions to an object [Object]. An object [Object], however, is that in 
the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. 
(B 137) 
Here, the term "Object" designates phenomenal objects, because only 
phenomenal objects, but not things in themselves, derive from the uni 
fication of the manifold of intuition.15 
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Elsewhere, Kant distinguishes between a broad sense and a narrow 
sense of the word "Object." Consider, for instance, the following passage 
from the second analogy of experience: 
T3 Now one can, to be sure, call everything, and even every rep 
resentation, insofar as one is conscious of it, an object [Object]; 
only what this word is to mean in the case of appearances, not 
insofar as they are (as representations) objects [Objecte], but 
rather only insofar as they designate an object [Object], requires 
a deeper investigation. . . . [A]ppearance, in contradistinction to 
the representations of apprehension, can . . . only be represented 
as the object [Object] that is distinct from them if it stands under 
a rule that distinguishes it from every other apprehension, and 
makes one way of combining the manifold necessary. That in the 
appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule 
of apprehension is the object [Object]. (A 189-191/B 234-236) 
The last occurrence of "Object" in T3 has the same meaning which 
"Object" has in T2. In both passages, "Object" designates phenomenal 
objects. In the terms of T2, these objects derive from the unification of 
the manifold of intuition by means of a priori concepts. In the terms of 
T3, these objects derive from the unification of an apprehended mani 
fold by means of necessary rules. The manifold of intuition of T2 is the 
apprehended manifold of T3. The a priori concepts of T2 are the neces 
sary rules of T3. They are the categories, which Kant sometimes calls 
"rules" (e.g., in B 145). 
The first occurrence of "Object" in T3 employs this word in a broader 
sense, which does not only encompass phenomenal objects, but also every 
representation.16 In other passages, Kant uses the term "Gegenstand," 
rather than "Object," in a broad sense. Consider, for instance, the fol 
lowing passages of the first Critique: 
T4 All representations, as representations, have their object [Gegen 
stand], and can themselves be objects [Gegenst?nde] of other 
representations in turn. (A 108, italics added) 
T5 The highest concept with which one is accustomed to begin a 
transcendental philosophy is usually the division between the 
possible and the impossible. But since every division presupposes 
a concept that is to be divided, a still higher one must be given, 
and this is the concept of an object [Gegenstande] in general (taken 
problematically, leaving undecided whether it is something or 
nothing). (A 290/B 346; see M. Dohna, 24:622) 
Other passages use the term "Gegenstand" in a narrow sense, to 
designate phenomenal objects. Below is an example: 
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T6 The sensible faculty of intuition is really only a receptivity for 
being affected in a certain way with representations . . ., which, 
insofar as they are connected and determinable in these relations 
(in space and time) according to laws of the unity of experience, 
are called objects [Gegenst?nde]. (A 494/B 522; see also A 106) 
The laws of the unity of experience, mentioned in this passage, are the 
transcendental laws of knowledge. Phenomenal objects are the objects 
which arise, or which can be represented, as the result of a synthesis 
(or in the terms of T6, a connection and determination) of empirical 
intuitions according to those laws. 
This battery of quotations supports two claims. The first claim is 
that Kant distinguishes between a broad sense and a narrow sense of 
"object": 
If one can have a mental representation of x, then x is an object in 
the broad sense (see T3, T5). 
If one can have a mental representation of x as the result of the 
synthesis of the manifold of empirical intuition according to the 
transcendental laws of knowledge, then x is an object in the narrow 
sense (see T2, T3, T6). 
Objects in the narrow sense include only phenomenal objects. Objects 
in the broad sense include, besides phenomenal objects: items which 
cannot be given in any experience, like a flat geometrical figure enclosed 
by two straight lines (A 220/B 268), God, and things in themselves, and 
other items which do not derive from the synthesis of empirical intu 
itions, such as numbers and a priori concepts. By contrast, objects in the 
broad sense do not include items which possess incompatible properties 
at the same time and under the same respect, such as a square circle. 
This is because: an object in the broad sense is something of which one 
can have a mental representation; according to Kant, it is impossible to 
have mental representations which violate the law of contradiction (B 
xxvi n.); and representations of items which have incompatible proper 
ties violate the law of contradiction. 
The second claim which Kant's texts support is that he does not 
make any clear-cut, systematical, and consistent difference in meaning 
between the terms "Object" and "Gegenstand." In fact, the quoted pas 
sages employ the term "Object," as well as "Gegenstand," to designate 
objects in the broad sense and objects in the narrow sense alike. In ad 
dition, the passages which define truth as the agreement of cognitions 
with objects use sometimes the term "Object," and other times the term 
"Gegenstand." For instance, Tl describes truth as the agreement of a 
cognition with its Gegenstand, whereas A 820-821/B 848-849 describes 
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truth as "agreement with the Objecte." Kant's use of "Object" and "Ge 
genstand" in these passages is fully interchangeable.17 
4. Objects and Truth 
Kant's texts never characterize objects in the broad sense by means of 
the notion of truth. For instance, the beginning of T3 contains a char 
acterization of objects in the broad sense without mention of truth. 
Objects in the broad sense include items such as things in themselves, 
concepts, and numbers, yet Kant's texts do not provide any reason to 
characterize these items by means of the notion of truth. 
Kant might characterize objects in the narrow sense by means of the 
notion of truth. Two remarks might give some plausibility to this view. 
First, Kant writes that, given transcendental idealism, "the objects must 
conform to our cognition" (B xvi), and "the representation alone makes 
the object possible" (B 124-125). With these statements, Kant might be 
suggesting that the notion of true cognition or true representation is at 
the basis of his notion of phenomenal object. Second, the Transcendental 
Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason describes mental processes that 
contribute to the constitution of phenomenal objects. How our mental 
representations can relate to objects is a leitmotiv of the Transcendental 
Analytic. The relation of representations to objects is also involved in 
the nominal definition of truth: truth, Kant writes, is the agreement of 
a cognition with the object to which it is related (A 48/B 83; L. P?litz, 
24:52526_28; J?sche-L., 9:512_4). This might suggest that the Transcen 
dental Analytic describes the constitution of phenomenal objects on the 
basis of the notion of truth. 
Generic references to Kant's employment of a correspondence jar 
gon?for instance, to his mention of the relation of representations to 
objects?might make Cassirer's view intuitively plausible. However, 
they are not sufficient to prove it. What would prove Cassirer's view is 
a mention or presupposition of the notion of truth in Kant's definition 
or most perspicuous characterization of phenomenal object. Yet Kant 
does not employ the notion of truth in his characterizations of the no 
tion of phenomenal object, such as those in T2, T3, T6, and A 106. The 
passages on the "Copernican turn" in the relation between cognitions 
and objects do not employ the word "truth" either. 
Cassirer might well agree that Kant does not use the term "truth" 
in his characterizations of phenomenal objects. However, Cassirer 
might advance a further argument for the claim that Kant's notion 
of phenomenal object presupposes the notion of truth. Cassirer might 
argue as follows. 
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Kant's descriptions of phenomenal objects (e.g., those in T2, T3, and 
T6) make reference to the manifold of intuition, synthesis, and rules. 
The rules at issue in T3 and T6 are the transcendental laws of knowl 
edge. The process of synthesis mentioned in T3 is a process which takes 
place through the application of those rules. According to Kant's texts, a 
phenomenal object is an item which can be represented as the result of 
a synthesis of the manifold of intuition according to the transcendental 
laws of knowledge. 
Kant relates not only the notion of phenomenal object, but also the 
notion of truth, to the synthesis of the manifold of intuition according 
to the transcendental laws of knowledge. He relates those notions in 
several passages, such as two passages from the Prolegomena. The first 
states: 
T7 The difference between truth and dream ... is not decided through 
the quality of the representations that are referred to objects, for 
they are the same in both, but through their connection according 
to the rules that determine the combination of representations in 
the concept of an object, and how far they can or cannot stand 
together in one experience. (4:290-291, italics added) 
The second passage discusses whether "experience carries with itself 
sure criteria to distinguish it from imagination." In this context, Kant 
writes: 
T8 Here the doubt can easily be removed, and we always remove it 
in ordinary life by investigating the connection of appearances 
in both space and time according to universal laws of experi 
ence, and if the representation of outer things consistently agrees 
therewith, we cannot doubt that those things should not constitute 
truthful experience. (4:337, italics added; see 4:374-375 and A 
492/B 520-521) 
According to the quoted passages, once one has a mental representa 
tion of appearances, and hence once one has empirical intuitions, those 
appearances will represent actual objects if and only if they conform 
to the transcendental laws of knowledge. This is tantamount to saying 
that a judgment based on empirical intuitions is true if and only if it 
conforms to the transcendental laws of knowledge. 
Kant's reference to intuitions and synthesis in his characterizations 
of phenomenal objects might be an implicit reference to the notion 
of truth, or at least to the notion of empirical truth: empirical truth 
consists in the synthesis of the manifold of intuition according to the 
transcendental laws of knowledge,18 and this very synthesis is at the 
basis of the notion of phenomenal object. If this is so, then Kant's notion 
of phenomenal object presupposes the notion of truth. Therefore, Kant 
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cannot define truth as correspondence of judgments with phenomenal 
objects, on pain of circularity. 
This argument can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Kant defines the notion of phenomenal object by mentioning the 
synthesis of the manifold of intuition according to the transcen 
dental laws of knowledge. 
(2) Empirical truth consists in the synthesis of the manifold of 
intuition according to the transcendental laws of knowledge. 
.'. (3) Kant's definition of phenomenal object presupposes the notion 
of truth. 
.'. (4) Kant cannot define truth as correspondence of a judgment with 
a phenomenal object (on pain of circularity). 
This argument is not tenable, because the link between the transcen 
dental laws of knowledge and empirical truth is weaker than the link 
between those laws and the notion of phenomenal object. 
In the above texts (T2, the end of T3, and T6), Kant illustrates what a 
phenomenal object is by making reference to the synthesis of intuitions 
according to the transcendental laws of knowledge. To say that x is a 
phenomenal object is to say that, once certain empirical intuitions are 
synthesized according to the transcendental laws of knowledge, they 
will yield a representation of x. 
By contrast, the Critical Kant never writes: to say that a judgment 
or an empirical judgment is true is to say that it is the result of a syn 
thesis of empirical intuitions according to the transcendental laws of 
knowledge. He does not even write that being true is being supported 
by intuitions and conforming to the transcendental laws of knowledge, 
with two sole exceptions: one sentence in Reflexion 5642, a personal 
note that Kant did not intend to publish (18:28016_18), and one sentence 
in a transcript of his logic lectures, the Logic Hechsel.19 However, the 
latter sentence is in contrast with statements which are right above and 
below it in the same passage.20 Thus, only one sentence from a personal 
note can count as evidence for the claim that the Critical Kant defined 
truth as agreement with intuitions and with the transcendental laws 
of knowledge. This is very weak evidence. 
Passages such as T7 and T8 prove at most that being warranted by 
intuitions, plus conforming to the transcendental laws of knowledge, 
is a feature coextensive with empirical truth: all true empirical judg 
ments, and only true empirical judgments, conform to the transcendental 
laws of knowledge and are supported by empirical intuitions. However, 
claiming this is not sufficient to explain what empirical truth is. Even 
268 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY 
if all philosophers and only philosophers wore red hats, "wearing a red 
hat" would not be an explanation of what it means to be a philosopher. 
Even if all and only those vertebrates which have a liver had a heart, 
"being a vertebrate with a heart" would not be an explanation of what 
it means to be a vertebrate with a liver. By the same token, even if all 
true empirical judgments and only true empirical judgments conformed 
to the transcendental laws of knowledge and were supported by empiri 
cal intuitions, conforming to the transcendental laws of knowledge and 
being supported by empirical intuitions might not be an explanation of 
what it means to be a true empirical judgment. Being a true empirical 
judgment might rather mean to correspond to an empirical, or phenom 
enal, object. 
Kant does not aim to explain what truth is in T7 and T8. Instead, 
he aims to provide a criterion to distinguish waking experiences from 
dreaming experiences. He provides that criterion in order to show that 
transcendental idealism does not give the same status to real objects 
in space and time and to the imaginary objects of dreams and illusions. 
Kant is keen to show this to differentiate his transcendental idealism 
from the idealism of his predecessors, like Berkeley. In Kant's view, 
the idealism of his predecessors is unable to account for the difference 
between real objects and imaginary ones (see Prol., 4:374-375). 
Kant's criterion to distinguish waking experiences from dreaming 
experiences also serves as a criterion to distinguish true judgments 
about empirical objects from false judgments about those objects: 
If you can formulate a judgment p as the result of a synthesis of em 
pirical intuitions according to the transcendental laws of knowledge, 
then p is true. If you can formulate the negation of a judgment p 
as the result of a synthesis of empirical intuitions according to the 
transcendental laws of knowledge, thenp is false.21 
This criterion is fully compatible with a correspondence conception 
of empirical truth. Kant claims that the nominal definition of truth 
is: "truth is the agreement of a cognition with its object."22 This claim 
entails that true judgments correspond with the objects they are about. 
That definition, being only "nominal," does not provide a criterion to 
distinguish true from false judgments.23 The possibility of formulating a 
judgment as the result of the synthesis of empirical intuitions according 
to the transcendental laws of knowledge provides a test or criterion to 
establish which empirical judgments satisfy the correspondence nominal 
definition of truth. 
In effect, the great majority of the sentences that start with the 
expressions "truth consists in" and "truth is" in Kant's Critical corpus 
make reference to objects. They state that truth is the agreement of a 
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cognition with the object it is about, or they lay out slight variations 
of this formula. At least eleven of those passages do not prefix this 
formula with "the nominal definition of truth is," "the nominal essence 
of truth is," "the concept of truth is," or "the meaning of 'is true' is."24 
Hence, Kant uses that formula to explain what truth, the very property 
of truth, literally is. 
If this is correct, then the explanation of what a phenomenal object 
is mentions the transcendental laws of knowledge, and the definition 
of truth employs the notion of object (be it a phenomenal object or an 
object in the broad sense). It follows that Kant does not explain what 
a phenomenal object is by means of the notion of truth. Vice versa, he 
explains what truth is by means of the notion of object. Thus, in the 
argument outlined at p. 267, (2) and (3) are both false. It is false that, 
for Kant, truth consists in the synthesis of the manifold of intuition 
according to the transcendental laws of knowledge, and it is false that 
Kant's notion of phenomenal object presupposes the notion of truth. 
5. Actuality and Truth 
Although Kant does not define the notions of object or of phenomenal 
object by means of the notion of truth, he might define the notion of 
actuality by means of the notion of truth. If he does, then he cannot 
define truth as the correspondence of a judgment with actual objects, 
on pain of circularity. 
However, Kant does not employ the terms "truth" and "true," when 
he explains what actuality is. Kant's Critical works contain two major 
explanations of the notion of actuality. The first is in the postulates of 
empirical thinking in general (A 225-226/B 272-274). The second is 
in the section of the first Critique on the transcendental ideal of God 
(A 597-601/B 625-629). These texts contain no occurrence of the word 
"true," but one occurrence of the word "truth." The occurrence of "truth" 
is in a sentence on the transcendental truth of the categories (A 222/B 
269). That sentence does not make any reference whatsoever to the 
truth of judgments or cognitions. The transcripts of Kant's metaphysics 
lectures from the Critical period do not employ the notion of truth to 
explain what actuality is either.25 They only state, on one occasion, that 
the truth of judgments corresponds to the actuality of objects, without 
adding any further comment on the relation between these two notions 
(M. Sch?n, 28:49332_33). If Kant intended to define actuality by means of 
the notion of truth, he could at least be more explicit. 
Nevertheless, a supporter of Cassirer's view might formulate the 
following argument for the claim that the notion of truth is implicit in 
Kant's notion of actuality. The second postulate of empirical thinking 
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characterizes the actuality of a phenomenal object as its agreement with 
the formal and material conditions of experience (A 218/B 265-266). 
The formal conditions of experience are the transcendental laws of 
knowledge. The material conditions of experience are the deliverances 
of the senses. Kant characterizes empirical truth in very similar terms. 
Empirical truth is the coherence of a judgment or cognition with the 
transcendental laws of knowledge and the deliverances of the senses. 
If this is so, then Kant's explanation of actuality mentions the material 
and formal conditions which constitute his characterization of empirical 
truth. This is a disguised reference to empirical truth in the explanation 
of actuality.26 Thus the notion of actuality, and thereby the notion of 
actual object, presupposes the notion of empirical truth. It follows that 
Kant cannot define truth as correspondence of a judgment with actual 
objects, on pain of circularity. 
This argument fails for two reasons. The first reason is that Kant does 
not explain what truth is in terms of agreement with the transcendental 
laws of knowledge and the deliverances of the senses. As we have seen 
in Section 4, Kant claims at most that empirical truth on the one hand, 
and the agreement with the transcendental laws of knowledge and the 
deliverances of the senses on the other hand, are coextensive features. 
This is compatible with several alternative accounts of what truth is (for 
instance, a correspondence account and a coherence account). 
The second reason is that the second postulate of empirical thinking 
does not explain what actuality is. The second postulate of empirical 
thinking is one of the synthetic principles of the pure understanding. 
These principles explain under which conditions the mind must apply 
each category to the deliverances of the senses: 
T9 For they are nothing other than propositions that subsume all 
perceptions (according to certain universal conditions of intuition) 
under those pure concepts of the understanding. (4:302) 
T10 These higher principles alone provide the concept, which contains 
the condition and as it were the exponent for a rule in general, 
while experience provides the case which stands under the rule. 
(A 159/B 198, trans, modified) 
The second postulate of empirical thinking explains under which condi 
tions the mind must apply the category of actuality to the deliverances 
of the senses, already subsumed under the transcendental forms of in 
tuition and the categories of quantity, quality, and relation. The second 
postulate prescribes: 
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apply the category of actuality to x if and only if x conforms to the 
transcendental laws of knowledge and you have empirical intuitions 
of x. 
The x ranges over representations of empirical objects. 
This formula implies that one must class every item which conforms 
to the transcendental laws of knowledge, and of which one has empirical 
intuitions, as actual. It does not imply that being actual means satisfying 
those conditions. In effect, according to Kant, God is actual (A 695-696/ 
B 723-724), but it does not satisfy those conditions, because we can 
not have empirical intuitions of God. If the above formula provided an 
explanation of what actuality is, that explanation would apply only to 
the actuality of phenomenal objects. "Actuality" would have a different 
meaning when applied to God. Therefore, "actuality" would be an am 
biguous term. However, Kant never states that "actuality" is ambiguous. 
He gives a non-ambiguous explanation of actuality, based on the notion 
of absolute positing, in the section of Transcendental Dialectic entitled 
"The Ideal of Pure Reason." That explanation extends over phenomenal 
objects, as well as over non-phenomenal items such as God.27 
If this is so, then the second postulate of empirical thinking is similar 
to passages T7 and T8. Those passages provide a test to establish the 
truth of empirical judgments, but they do not provide a definition of 
empirical truth. Likewise, the second postulate of empirical thinking 
provides a test to establish whether a phenomenal object is actual, but 
it does not explain what being actual is. 
To sum up, the above argument for the claim that Kant defines actual 
ity by means of the notion of truth fails. This is because of two reasons. 
First, truth is not the agreement of a judgment with the formal and 
material conditions of possible experience. Second, actuality is not the 
agreement of an object with the formal and material conditions of pos 
sible experience. As Kant characterizes neither the notion of actuality, 
nor his two notions of object by means of the notion of truth, Cassirer's 
argument must be rejected. Other arguments may be more successful 
than Cassirer's in proving that Kant's idealism is incompatible with a 
correspondence theory of truth. 
In conclusion, the study and refutation of Cassirer's argument alone 
does not enable us to conclusively establish whether Kant can endorse a 
correspondence theory of truth. However, it suggests that we should not 
trust short arguments from a certain ontological outlook to a particular 
theory of truth. In absence of general arguments for the incompatibility 
of idealism with a correspondence theory of truth, the answer to the 
question of whether an idealist ontology is compatible with a correspon 
dence theory, and the evaluation of any argument for this claim, require 
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a careful examination of the ontology and theory of truth at stake. A 
detailed examination is also necessary to establish if Kant, or recent 
upholders of various forms of idealism, internal realism, and anti-real 
ism, can consistently endorse a correspondence theory of truth. 
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